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1 The Horn of Africa is one of the least known regions of the globe and receives media
attention over fighting in or near Mogadisho, piracy or terrorism. The image of Somalia
as failed state does not fit the reality that there are areas which carry on their lives–like
African communities have done for thousands of years–under traditional local authority
without state institutions. In Northern Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland have since 1990,
emerged  as  two  states,  with  the  former  acting  independently  from  Somalia  and
Mogadisho since 1991. 
2 Bradbury has accompanied democratic processes in Somaliland since the civil  war as
worker for international NGOs, and more recently as election observer. As such he brings
a  different  perspective  than  diplomats,  journalists  or  academics,  and  demonstrates
thorough knowledge of clan and sub-clan relations, alliances or conflicts, political actors,
and the constitutional  and electoral  processes.  For him Somaliland is  a de facto state
which exercises control over (most of) its borders, has its own currency, levies taxes and
sports state symbols such as flag and national anthem. More importantly, it has reached a
higher  degree  of  civil  liberties,  economic  freedom  and  democratically  elected
government than any other country in the region. With its refusal to recognize Somali-
land the international community is applying double standards, since it has acted swiftly
to recognize breakaway Yugoslavian or Soviet Republics (e.g. Kosovo within a few days).
Its  recognition  and  costly  funding  of  the  Transitional  Federal  Government  as  only
representative of all Somalis seems, after 15 failed peace conferences, rather unrealistic. 
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3 In  the  historical  overview,  Bradbury  shows  Muslim  groups  from  Yemen  gradually
developing into six major clans : Issaq and Gadabursi in the Northwest, Warsangeli and
Durbahante  in  the  North-East,  and  Darod  and  Hawiye  in  the  South,  mixing  with
Ethiopians (Oromo) and Arab traders colonizing Africa’s East coast since the 1st Millenium
BC at least. Through treaty with Issaq Sultan in 1827 Britain established a Protectorate to
secure the shipping lanes from Aden into the Red Sea–but relied on self-rule by elders
and sheikhs. British Somaliland gained independence in 1960 but joined Somalia Italiana,
which became independent four days later in the general euphoria for Pan-Africanism.
An act of union was not yet ready and could only be approved by Somalia’s parliament a
year later–therefore Somaliland today contests  the validity of  the union,  since never
approved by its then territorial legislature. 
4 First national elections made Northern Somalis realize to be in minority gaining only 25 %
of  parliamentary  seats  and  four  cabinet  posts.  Eventually,  their  representative
Mohammed Ibrahim Egal  became prime minister in 1967,  but the first  president and
prime  minister  (Adan  Abdallah  Osman  and  Ali  Rashid  Shamarke)  were  southerners.
Already in 1961 the former British protectorate rejected a constitutional referendum, and
British-trained junior officers even attempted a coup ; a charge of treason was dismissed
on the grounds that Somalia had no jurisdiction over Somaliland without a Union Act.
The North remained backward and underdeveloped, while the South had attained modest
degrees of modernization under post-World War II UN mandate in the Italian colony, with
a growing urban and rural working class under Italian private enterprise. 
5 First President Adan Abdallah was assassinated in 1969 and the army seized power under
Major  Siyad  Barre.  He  suspended  the  constitution  and  established  a  one-party
dictatorship under a Supreme Revolutionary Council and a Socialist Party with Soviet
assistance–as in Afghanistan and Nasser’s Egypt. The state sought to control the entire
economy  cancelling  customary  rights,  nationalising  range  lands,  and  enclosing  vast
pasturelands for state ranches which blocked herd movements.  These experiments in
cooperative agriculture and ranches failed miserably, so that when Saudi Arabia banned
livestock imports in 1983/1984, export revenues declined so much that Somalia became
insolvent and third largest aid recipient in Africa. A forced IMG liberalization drive had
the further consequence that state functionaries seized former clan and now state assets
to become “businessmen” or “land owners”. 
6 Barre, counting on Soviet support, invaded Ethiopia in 1977 hoping to recover the Ogaden
region.  Instead of  him, the Soviets supported Mariam Mengistu who had overthrown
Haile  Selassie  and pushed out  Somalia’s  army which  withdrew to  Hargeisa.  In  1981,
Northern officers formed the Somali National Movement (SNM), which operated from
refugee camps for Ogaden Somalis assisted by Western aid organizations inside Ethiopia. 
7 The North, marginalised by the central government received only 7 % of its development
budget compared with 41 % for Mogadisho alone, was treated especially hard by the army
which  imposed  import  and  currency  restrictions  on  Isaaq  livestock  merchants,
confiscated their goods from the Gulf and destroyed qat fields, berkeds and rangeland by
mines.  Somaliland has presented evidence to the International  Criminal  Court  that  a
special army brigade was formed for Isaaq liquidation, rape, killings and extortion of
Isaaq clan members. 
8 The “Hargeisa group” of  professionals  returned from the Gulf  States  around 1978 to
rehabilitate  the  Hargeisa  hospital  was  so  successful  that  it  was  chosen  by  elders  as
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representative to denounce Southern discrimination. The government sent them to court
but widespread demonstrations disrupted the trial on 20 feb., 1982, which were crushed
by the army, with arrests and killings of several students, while the 15 member group was
sentenced to ten years of maximum security prison. 
9 The SNM attacked Hargeisa and Bur’ao shortly later, achieving further defections from
army officers, and in 1983 stormed the Berbera prison. In 1988 Ethiopia concluded peace
with Siad Barre and closed SNM sanctuaries. Now began an offensive against Hargeisa and
Bur’o, which government countered with air strikes. It also armed Gadabursi, Warsangeli,
and Dhurbahante as part of its counter-offensive against the Isaaq. Now SNM began to
support insurgent movements in the south (USC, SPM, SSDF and Aideed), as it did not
participate in the battle for Mogadisho which overthrew Barre on Jan. 27, 1991, but sent
weapons.  Shortly  afterwards  it  captured  Berbera  and  Hargeisa,  Bur’o,  Borama  and
Erigavo.  Though  it  also  clashed  with  Gadabursi  and  Warsangeli,  and  made  the
Dhulbahante evacuate Aynabo, it opted for a reconciliation process steered by the elders
and initially did not contemplate secession. 
10 When rumours circulated that SNM wanted to negotiate with Southern factions people
surrounded its headquarters in Hargeisa on 15 May, 1991 shouting “no more Mogadisho”,
and  asked  SNM’s  central  committee  to  establish  a  separate  Somaliland  Republic.
Reconciliation  meetings  with  Warsangeli  elders  were  held  in  Sanaag,  and  with
Dhulhahante. Both declared their support for Somali-land and mandated SNM to govern
for two years as sole party, under its chairman Abdi-Rahman Ali “Tuur”. 
11 In January 1992 fighting broke out in Bur’ao between Habar Jal’o and Habar Yunis over
arms control ; and in Berbera in March 1992 (sheep wars) over control of the port by the
“Ise Musa” who had expropriated revenues from livestock exports. 
12 When fourty elders and religious leaders from the Gadabursi,  Isaaq and Dhulbahante
brokered a cease-fire at the Sheik conference, reaffirming the public status of the port
thus giving government revenue for rebuilding, this group of elders, called Guurti, became
the upper house of the future parliament, which has functioned till today. The temporary
administration of 1991-93 failed in its goal to establish security. Though it tried to case
militias in barracks, forbade the carrying of arms and established regional police posts,
some demobilized SNM units resorted to banditism and looting. It also failed in setting up
new administrative structures–simply translating the SNM central committee, chairman
and vice-chairman into “parliament”, President and Vice-President. In 1993 Dhulbahante
elders from the Sanaag, Sool and Haud created their own administrative council for Sool,
and  the  Gadabursi  in  Erigavo  also  created  a  council  but  authorized  its  governor  to
negotiate with the SNM. 
13 Mohammed Egal was given the task to form the first Somaliland Government (1993-1997).
His father was a merchant and property owner from the Habar Awal and his mother from
the Habar Yunis. Educated in British Somali-land, Sudan and England, he became General
Secretary,  i.e.  First  Minister in the British colony,  and first  president of  independent
Somaliland. Under Barre he was detained until 1975, later appointed ambassador, then
detained again until 1982, when he was appointed Chamber of Commerce chairman till
1991. Selected as co-chairmen of the Djibouti reconciliation conference (1991) he was
deemed capable of reconciling the Isaaq, and did succeed with SNM demobilization. He
re-built the private economy based on livestock exports, customs and transit fees from
Berbera. But support from the other clans was weak, however, and only Aideed’s death in
Mogadisho  ended  their  support  for  federalism,  and  brought  their  consent  for
Bradbury, Mark. – Becoming Somaliland
Cahiers d’études africaines, 201 | 2011
3
independence. A national conference at Hargeisa (oct. 1996 to feb. 1997) ended the civil
war,  oversaw disengagement of  forces,  ended remaining conflicts  and negotiated the
return of property. 
14 Though he had not elaborated a constitution or democratic reforms, Egal was selected for
another term (1997-2002), stability since 1993 had favored growth from livestock exports,
and led to a budget surplus from civil service reform and infrastructure investments.
TOTAL SA rehabilitated Berbera’s oil  storage and rented it  to Ethiopia which favored
Berbera over Djibouti as its importexport hub. 
15 Yet new challenges on the international scene came with the creation of Puntland and
TNG (transitional national government) : after 12 failed peace conferences, veteran SSDF
leader Abdulay Yusuf decided to become president of autonomous Puntland (undoubtedly
after contracts with CONOCO for oil prospection), based “upon a notion of Darod/Harty
unity which includes the Majeerteen of Mudug, Nugal and Bari regions, the Dhulbahante
of Sool and the Warsengeli of eastern Sanaag”. Yusuf used this base for increasing his role
in the TNG formed at  Djibouti  in  2000,  and effectively  became president  of  the TFG
(transitional federal government) in 2004. However, the TFG in Jowhar, and later Baidoa,
was at the mercy of war lords, which were only eliminated by the Islamic Courts Union in
2006. While from 2002-2006 conflict in Southern Somalia was more widespread than ever,
peace and stability reigned in Somaliland. 
16 Egal, however, took time to present a draft constitution–because parliament resisted his
idea  of  a  powerful  executive  and  requested  supervision  of  finance,  ministerial
appointments and human rights violations. A referendum of 31 May, 2001–boycotted in
parts of Sanaag, Sool and Awdal–accepted the constitution, which was called “illegal” by
TNG. This constitution stipulated that president, legislature and district councils were to
be elected by secret popular vote, based on party lines, rather than by appointed elders.
Women also could vote and hold office. By 2001 seven parties had registered, but during
election  campaign,  Egal  narrowly  survived  a  parliamentary  impeachment  vote  over
revenues from Berbera Port Authority and from contracts with Total. He suddenly died
on 3 May, 2002 during surgery in South Africa and his Vice-President Kahin Riyale had to
complete his term. 
17 As  Somaliland’s  constitution  advocated  transition  from  selected  to  elected
representation, the process began with district elections followed by presidential  and
finally  parliamentary  elections.  Though  neither  National  Electoral  Commission  nor
parties had experience with election organisation, or held a census for voter registration,
they went ahead and were judged by international observers to have done a job conform
to the international norms. District elections took place 15 dec., 2002, in 19 out of 23
districts, Eastern Sanaag and Sool not including, when 440,000 voters elected 332 local
council members. The parties UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID were deemed qualified to contest
the presidential  elections of 2003 and parliamentary elections in 2005.  Vice-President
Riyale was elected president, and UDUB became the largest party in 2005, without having
a controlling majority in parliament, faced by a strong opposition from the other two. 
18 Bradbury sees  the  following challenges  face  Somaliland :  insufficient  funding for  the
administration  due  to  lack  of  international  recognition  and  access  to  international
banking or aid, and thus party and government dependence on private merchants and
remittances from the diaspora, making corruption and the shadow economy a threat to
security, rule of law and an independent judiciary. Though the upper house is to check
executive abuse, the rules for its selection and funding remain unclear. On the other hand
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Sharia and IUC in the South, with unsecured borders, are real threats to security and rule
of  law,  making  entry  by  Islamic  radicals  relatively  easy  for  perpetrating  attacks  on
individuals  or  government  infrastructure.  Finally  the  eastern  clans  still  view
independence as an Isaaq project and may prefer to work with Puntland and the TFG. Yet
Somaliland’s majority stands solidly behind independence. 
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